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Effective communication entails the strategic presentation of information; good
communicators present representative information to their listeners—information that
is both consistent with the concept being communicated and also unlikely to support
another concept a listener might consider. The present study examined whether
preschool-age children effectively select information to manipulate others’ semantic
knowledge, by testing how children choose information to teach or deceive their
listeners. Results indicate that preschoolers indeed effectively select information to meet
some specific communicative goals. When asked to teach others, children selected
information that effectively spanned the concept of interest and avoided overly restrictive
or overly general information; when asked to deceive others, they selected information
consistent with the intended deceptive messages under some circumstances. Thus,
preschool children possess remarkable abilities to select the best information to
manipulate what others believe.
Keywords: evidence selection, teaching, deception, cognitive development, pedagogy
Introduction
Eﬀective communication often entails the strategic presentation of information: politicians
describe uncontroversial portions of their proposals and leave out less palatable details; storytellers
present the components of their narratives slowly to build anticipation of major events; teachers
present unambiguous examples to help learners obtain new concepts, leaving aside exceptions,
and qualiﬁcations until the basic ideas are in place. In each case, eﬀective communicators
consider the information relevant to the beliefs they wish to communicate, reason about how
particular information will shape the mental states of listeners, and present speciﬁc information
accordingly. That is, good communicators select representative information—information that is
both consistent with the concept being communicated and also unlikely to support another concept
a listener might consider (Griﬃths and Tenenbaum, 2001; Shafto and Goodman, 2008). By quite
early in development, children can make accurate guesses about the concepts being communicated
from representative information (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; Gopnik and Wellman, 2012). Less is
known, however, about children’s ability to select information in the service of communicating a
concept to another.
Here we examine whether preschool-age children make eﬀective use of information to
manipulate others’ beliefs by testing whether they strategically select information to teach or
deceive their listeners. By quite early in development, children systematically consider their social
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partners’ mental states when providing information. For
example, in the second year of life (ages 18–24 months),
infants track whether other people hold true or false beliefs
about the locations of objects and intervene by pointing to
communicate true locations only when necessary (i.e., only
to prevent a person holding a false belief from making a
mistake; Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2012a,b; see also Buttelmann
et al., 2009). Furthermore, 2-year-olds are more likely to add
verbal cues for a partner when pointing alone may produce
ambiguity in the referent (O’Neill and Topolovec, 2001), and
3- and 4-year-olds understand the relationship been ambiguous
messages and communication failure (Robinson and Robinson,
1982) and produce more informative speech when their partner
does not have visual access to a scene (Matthews et al.,
2006).
In the later preschool years, children also develop the ability to
attend to another’s beliefs in order to eﬀectively select arguments
for persuasion. For example, Bartsch et al. (2011) investigated
3, 4–5, and 6–7 year-old children’s persuasion of people and
puppets. They found that only the 6–7 year-olds showed greater
attention to beliefs for people than puppets. Similarly, Sodian
and Schneider (1990) investigated 4–6 year-old children’s abilities
to assist or hinder a partner by placing targets in expected
or unexpected locations. They found a clear developmental
trend progressing from failure to competency over this age
range.
In addition to tracking the mental states of others when
providing information, children’s early deceptive behaviors also
reﬂect attempts to instill speciﬁc mental states in other people.
Simple deceptive behaviors, such as denying having performed
an action (Lewis et al., 1989), withholding information (Peskin,
1992), or marking an incorrect location (Chandler et al., 1989;
Russell et al., 1991; Sodian et al., 1991; Carlson et al., 1998) emerge
in the preschool years and are linked to false-belief and inhibitory
control (e.g., Talwar and Lee, 2008). These tests of early deceptive
behaviors have focused on fairly simple manipulations of episodic
knowledge—children deceptively communicating that previous
events either did or did not occur. Even in these straightforward
contexts, preschool-age children often undermine their own
intentions to deceive by accidentally “leaking” information that
reveals the truth (Talwar and Lee, 2002). Thus, although prior
work has shown that young children attempt to manipulate
others’ mental states through deception, based on this work,
children’s understanding of the relation between the information
they provide and their partners’ mental states appears somewhat
precarious.
Here we examine whether preschool-age children can
strategically select information to instill particular semantic
knowledge in other people. Success on such a task would
require selecting the most eﬀective information to communicate
particular messages—unlike the tasks described above, which
involved a simpler decision of whether to provide information
or not.
Previous work examining children’s ability to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of multiple sets of evidence comes primarily
from the literature on scientiﬁc reasoning, and suggests that
metacognitive reasoning about evidence often develops fairly
late in childhood (Bindra et al., 1980; Fay and Klahr, 1996;
Koslowski, 1996; Chen and Klahr, 1999; Klahr and Chen,
2003; Masnick and Klahr, 2003). For example, preschool-age
children often have diﬃculty deciding whether particular sets of
information provide good support for new hypotheses (Rhodes
et al., 2008). Indeed, even older children and adults struggle
with designing informative interventions in order to generate
meaningful evidence (Kuhn et al., 1988; Kuhn, 1989).
Communicative contexts involving simpler concepts might
reveal earlier, nascent forms of information-selection abilities,
however. For example, Rhodes et al. (2010) found that 6-year-olds
select information more strategically when asked to communicate
a concept to someone else than when asked to discover a
concept for themselves. Thus, communicative contexts may elicit
particularly sophisticated use of information. In the present
study, we asked preschoolers to choose a representative sample
of information to teach or deceive another about a concept,
providing a test of whether preschoolers can eﬀectively select
information to manipulate the semantic knowledge of other
people.
Materials and Methods
Participants (N = 64, 34 female; Mage = 4.9 years, range = 3.8–
6.1 years) were assigned to either Teaching (N = 32) or Deception
(N = 32) conditions. An additional 10 participants began testing
but were excluded: three for experimenter error, one for familial
interference, and six for not completing the entire study. There
were no diﬀerences in age across conditions, F(3,60) = 1.27, ns.
All study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Board at New York University.
Children were introduced to a novel toy and a transparent
container ﬁlled with blocks. The blocks included four
demonstration blocks and four blocks to be used as test
(see Figure 1), though at the beginning of the experiment, all
of the blocks were intermixed in the transparent container. In a
seemingly random fashion, the experimenter drew the set of four
demonstration blocks from the container and laid them on the
table in front of the child in one of two orders, counterbalanced
across participants. To familiarize children with the blocks, they
were asked to point to each one (e.g., “Can you point to the red
triangle?”).
Next children were shown a demonstration of how the toy
worked. Half of children within each condition were taught that
placing any of the blocks on the machine would “make it go”
(cause an attached propeller to spin), whereas the other half were
taught that only red blocks would “make it go1.”
1Data collection proceeded in two phases. First, 32 children participated (randomly
assigned to Teaching or Deception conditions) in the procedure in which children
were told that all blocksmake the toy go. Second, another 32 children participated
(randomly assigned to Teaching or Deception conditions) in the procedure in
which children were told that only red blocks make the toy go. There were no
diﬀerences in age across these samples, t(62) = 0.63, p = 0.531. Of the children
who participated in the ﬁrst batch of data collection, half ﬁrst participated in
another study (participating in the other study did not aﬀect the present results;
χ2(4)= 6.12, p= 0.2).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Set of four blocks used to demonstrate that all blocks make the toy go. (B) The novel toy pictured in the off position and the on position.
(C) Participants were asked to select two blocks, from this set of four possible blocks, to show Daisy so that she can infer the rule specified by the child’s condition.
For example, to teach that all blocks could turn on the toy,
children were told, “Now we’re going to play a game with my
special toy. This toy is special because my blocks make it go. All
of my blocks make it go! Let me show you how it works.” The
experimenter proceeded to place each of the blocks on top of the
machine. Each time the experimenter said, “Oh look! Did you see
the toy go? This block made my toy go.” The propeller turned
on each time. After all four demonstrations, the experimenter
picked up each block one at a time and asked, “So did this block
make the toy go?” All of the participants answered correctly.
The experimenter reiterated that all of the blocks activated the
machine, including the rest of the blocks (the test set) in the
transparent bucket, by saying, “All of the blocks make it go! All
of the blocks we have laid out here, and All of the blocks in the
bucket too!” The experimenter then put the demonstration blocks
back in the transparent container.
The procedure for children assigned to learn that only red
blocks activated the toy was similar, but modiﬁed as necessary
(e.g., “Let’s put this yellow triangle on the toy and see what
happens. [Toy does not activate]. Oh look- the toy didn’t go! The
yellow triangle does not make my toy go”).
Children were then introduced to a puppet, “Daisy,” and told
that she did not know which blocks would activate the toy. The
puppet was then removed from sight. In the Teaching condition,
children were then told that their goal was to teach Daisy how
the toy worked. For children who had been told that all blocks
made the toy go, the experimenter said, “A little while ago, I had
a diﬀerent toy that looked just like this toy, but for my old toy,
only red blocks made it go.” They were reminded that for the
current toy all the blocks make it go and told that their goal was to
help Daisy learn that all blocks make it go. For children who were
told that only red blocks make the toy go, they were told, “Daisy
might be wrong about how the toy works and think all blocks
make it go.” They were reminded that really only red blocks make
it go.
In the Deception condition, children who had been told that
really all blocks activate the toy were told, “Let’s play a fun trick
on Daisy and make her think that only red blocks make it go.”
They were then reminded that in reality, all the blocks make it
go, but that their goal was to trick Daisy to make her think that
only red blocks make it go. Children who had been told that
really only red blocks activate the toy were told, “Let’s play a fun
trick on Daisy, and make her think that all blocks make it go.”
They were then reminded that in reality, only red blocks make it
go.
Children in all conditions were then presented with four
new blocks (Figure 1)—the set of possible information—and
were asked to select two of the four blocks to communicate the
intended concept to Daisy (e.g., “Let’s pick the best two blocks to
show her” [Teaching: “so she will learn that (all blocks/only red
blocks) make it go”; Deception: “to trick her into thinking that
(all blocks/only red blocks) make it go”]). In all conditions, the
experimenter asked, “So remind me one more time. How many
blocks are we going to show Daisy?” Corrective feedback was
given when necessary. Daisy was then brought back into view,
and the experimenter said, “Remember, you can pick any of these
four blocks to show Daisy to help her think about how the toy
works.” Children were then asked to select two blocks. Daisy
was then put away and the experimenter asked, “Remind me,
what really makes the toy go?” The majority of children in both
conditions correctly generated the response consistent with the
rule they had been taught (“all blocks” or “red blocks”; Teaching,
26/32; Deception, 28/32).
Results
Children’s information selection uniquely and unambiguously
fell into one of three categories: teaching, deception target,
other (Figure 2). Children eﬀectively selected block pairs to
communicate the belief speciﬁed by their condition; their
selections diﬀered depending on whether they were given a
teaching goal or a deceptive goal, χ2(2, N = 64) = 12.34,
p = 0.002. Overall, when children were asked to teach, 20 picked
the best set of information to communicate the truth, six picked
block pairs consistent with the deception target, and six picked
another set of blocks. When children were asked to deceive,
18 picked the best set of blocks to deceive, seven picked the
best set to communicate the truth, and seven picked another
set. Children’s response patterns reliably diﬀered from chance2
in both Teaching and Deception conditions (by binomial tests:
Teaching, p< 0.001; Deception, p< 0.01).
Within the Teaching condition, there was no eﬀect of
whether children were asked to teach the “all rule” or “red
2We used the most conservative chance comparison of 1/3; for the red
demonstrations, chance is smaller (1/6).
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FIGURE 2 | Number of children choosing blocks in the Teaching and Deception conditions. Two possible block pairings convey the “All Rule”; one pair
conveys the “Red Rule”; three remaining pairs convey other rules. (Probability of randomly selecting blocks consistent with “All Rule” = 2/6, “Red Rule” = 1/6, “Other
Rules” = 3/6).
rule,” χ2(2, N = 32) = 2.13, ns; children’s responses in
both conditions were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the predicted
distribution if responses were at chance [see Figure 1; “all
rule”: χ2(2, N = 16) = 6.50, p = 0.04; “red rule”: χ2(2,
N = 16) = 39.31, p < 0.001]. In the Deception condition,
however, children’s responses diﬀered by the deceptive message,
χ2(2, N = 32) = 8.42, p = 0.02. When children were asked to
deceive the puppet into thinking that only red blocks operated
the toy (when really all blocks did so), children reliably picked
the set of blocks that communicated this message (binomial,
p < 0.001) and were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the predicted
distribution if responses were at chance, χ2(2, N = 16) = 46.06,
p < 0.001. In contrast when children were asked to deceive the
puppet into thinking that all blocks turned on the toy (when
really only red blocks did so), children did not select the correct
response above chance levels and children’s responses did not
diﬀer from the predicted distribution if responses were at chance,
χ2(2, N = 16) = 5.31, p= 0.07; see Figure 1.
Half of children (n = 32, the second half tested in both
conditions) were asked at the end of the session whether, after
seeing the chosen blocks, the puppet would understand how the
toy works or whether she would make mistakes. Responses to this
question varied by condition as expected, χ2(1, N = 32) = 9.34,
p = 0.002; most children (12/16) in the Teaching condition
expected her to know how the toy works, whereas most children
(12/16) in the Deception condition expected her to make
mistakes. That is, critically, children understood that in the
Deception condition they were conveying incorrect information
that would lead the puppet to make mistakes.
Across conditions, children’s responses to the ﬁnal question
were also associated with whether they showed the best
information to present the truth (of children who presented the
best set of blocks to communicate the truth, 12 said she would
know how the toy works and seven said she would makemistakes;
of children who present any other block pairs, nine said she
would make mistakes, and four said she would know how the toy
works, χ2(1, N = 32)= 3.90, p< 0.05. These results also support
the claim that children understand the relationship between
the information presented and the eﬀect of this information
on another’s understanding. Whether children picked the best
information as speciﬁed by their condition, however, (e.g., the
best set of blocks to communicate the truth in the Teaching
condition but to communicate the intended deceptive message
in the Deception condition), was not related to whether they
answered this question accurately (p= 0.69).
Discussion
In this study, preschoolers eﬀectively selected information to
teach or deceive other people. Both conditions require a level of
strategic information selection that goes beyond what has been
previously demonstrated by children of this age. When children
were asked to teach that all blocks operate the machine, all of
the block pairs that children could choose were consistent with
the truth (i.e., that all blocks turn on the toy). Yet children
were more likely to select information that spanned the concept
and thus avoided communicating an overly restricted rule (e.g.,
that only squares or yellow blocks turn on the toy). That is,
while it would have been technically accurate for children to
select two red blocks, two yellow blocks, two circle blocks, or
two square blocks, only the two possible response pairs that
spanned both concepts (a red square and yellow circle, or a
yellow square and red circle) were counted as accurate in the
“all rule” condition. Children reliably selected these concept-
spanning pairs. In contrast, when children were asked to teach
a narrower rule (i.e., that only red blocks activate the toy), they
reliably selected blocks to communicate this concept.
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In the Deception condition, when children were told that
really all blocks activate the toy but asked to “trick” the puppet
into a believing that only red blocks did so, children were
able to inhibit their knowledge of the true rule and eﬀectively
select information that would communicate the false, overly
restricted rule. In contrast, when children were told that only
red blocks activated the toy and were asked to trick the puppet
into believing instead that all blocks did so, they failed to do
so at statistically signiﬁcant rates. One thing to note is that this
is the only condition where successful communication of the
intended message would have required the presentation of false
information—telling the puppet, for example, that a block would
activate the toy when it really wouldn’t do so (the other Deception
condition simply required children to present a misleading
set of accurate but too restrictive information). Thus, children
might not have reliably communicated the intended message
in this condition because they were either unwilling to present
information that was explicitly false, or did not understand
that doing so was an option. Alternately (or additionally), they
could have had trouble selecting false information because they
could not inhibit their own knowledge of the true rule. Finally,
children may have been more likely to succeed in the “red
blocks” condition because the rule “red blocks” helped provide
information about which blocks (the red ones) that would be
optimal for selection. Examining why children did not reliably
present false information here, when they were willing to present
accurate but deceptive information, thus remains an important
question for future work.
In our study, children’s ages spanned older 3-year-olds up
to 6-year-olds. Although most children were 4- to 5-year-olds,
one might wonder whether older children in our conditions
were more likely to succeed at our task than younger ones.
For example, children’s abilities to select persuasive arguments
(Bartsch et al., 2011) and eﬀectively cue or deceive others on
target-search tasks (Sodian and Schneider, 1990) improve across
the later preschool and early elementary school years. Yet, we did
not ﬁnd any correlation between age and success on our task, and
splitting our sample of 64 children in half by age also revealed no
diﬀerence between the younger half of 32 (18 succeeding) and the
older half (13 succeeding), χ2(2, N = 64)= 0.26, ns. Future work
might investigate the degree to which even younger children
succeed at information selection tasks like the one used here, and
also why developmental diﬀerences across early childhood arise
for some information selection tasks but not for others.
In future work, it will also be useful to examine in more
detail why children can eﬀectively select sets of information in
some communicative contexts when they have trouble doing so
in some tests of their scientiﬁc reasoning (Bindra et al., 1980;
Fay and Klahr, 1996; Koslowski, 1996; Chen and Klahr, 1999;
Klahr and Chen, 2003; Masnick and Klahr, 2003). One possibility
is that diﬀerent reasoning mechanisms support information
communication vs. information discovery (Rhodes et al., 2010).
Yet, another possibility is that children succeeded in the present
task because it involved simpler concepts than have been tested
in prior work. Indeed, Ruﬀman et al. (1993) and Koerber et al.
(2005) found that the age at which children can successfully
reason about how patterns of evidence lead to particular mental
during scientiﬁc reasoning depends on features of the task
complexity. Similarly, in our on-going work, we have found
that even in instances of concept communication, preschool-age
children show less systematic information selection when the
number of dimensions that varies across the sets of information
increases (and thus children have to consider a much larger
hypothesis space). These diﬀerences in task complexity may
also explain why other research that examines children’s use
of information to persuade or deceive others (e.g., Sodian
and Schneider, 1990; Bartsch et al., 2011) shows proﬁciencies
later in development than found here. Systematically comparing
children’s information selection across diﬀerent types of learning
contexts for tasks equated for these stimulus features is thus
necessary to determine the boundaries and developmental
timescale of children’s abilities.
The present study extends prior work on the development
of theory of mind (Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2012a,b) and
deception by showing that not only can children consider their
social partner’s current and intended mental states to provide
information about whether a prior event occurred, they can
strategically select between multiple sets of truthful information
to instill speciﬁc semantic knowledge in other people. These
results contribute to a growing body of evidence that, from an
early age, children exhibit surprising, seemingly sophisticated
abilities to learn in and reason about social and communicative
contexts.
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